



6 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Ikle's Letter on Soviet Strategic
Doctrine and Policy

1. The letter from Ikle refers to an ad hoc group on Soviet strategic doctrine and policy, says that the "consensus" of the group was that CIA could be asked to make an assessment of a particular question, and provides an enclosure which presents several other questions of interest to the group. This memorandum addresses each of these three aspects of Ikle's letter.

2. Ikle's letter was obviously written by John Newhouse who recently joined ACDA. I attended one of the two meetings of the so-called group chaired by Newhouse. Some of the people who attended the second meeting had not attended the first and vice versa. It was a very disorganized meeting with several of the ACDA attendees coming in and going out. I got the feeling that CIA people had been invited in order to get us to do research and attend meetings for the primary purpose of educating John Newhouse.

3. It was also my impression that Newhouse and others in ACDA were reacting to a feeling that they were not playing a leading role in SALT and were looking for some way to get a piece of the action. Because Newhouse had not made any serious effort to read the classified work which had been done on the subject, I suggested that he ask INR to supply him with what had

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been done. Bill Hyland who was present was not enthusiastic about this. [redacted] invited Newhouse to his office to describe what work had been done and what was under way. Near the end of the meeting, I made the statement that our resources were too involved in addressing important questions from important people to be diverted to educating Newhouse. It was clear to me that Newhouse really wants to run a series of seminars where people present the results of research on topics Newhouse selects. In the abstract I think this would be very useful to all concerned; pragmatically, our people working on these subjects are so tied up on direct support to SALT, NSSMs, and NIEs that we do not have the time.

4. Even though I attended the meeting, I did not realize that the group reached a "consensus" on anything. When the question of why the Soviets have invested so little in heavy bomber development and deployment came up, I did say that this topic would be easier to handle than most of the others raised at the meeting. I suppose this is the basis for Newhouse picking this particular topic as an example of the research we might do for him. If we were asked to discuss the question, we could do it, but I don't think that question is important enough to invest our scarce analytical resources in doing a thorough historical research paper.

5. The questions presented in the enclosure to Ikle's letter are really good. They are among the questions that we will be working on in the Strategic Evaluation Center of OSR as we increase the staffing of that new organization. But, at present the SEC has far more immediate questions to address which are directly related to urgent US policy considerations.

6. In sum, Ikle's proposal has much merit in principal, but from a practical point of view our resources are already too fully committed to support his proposal. Even beyond that, I see no particular benefit to be gained by having John Newhouse control the topics we work on or our approach to them.

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7. On the assumption that you did not discuss this matter with Ikle earlier this week and if you feel his letter needs a response, I have attached a proposed written response for your consideration.



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EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment

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